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407 
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.: The Ninth 
Circuit Sends the Totten Bar Flying Away on the 
Jeppesen Airplane  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the en banc decision of Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 
(“Jeppesen”), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that the Reynolds privilege iteration of the state secrets 
doctrine precluded the suits of several alleged victims of the 
government’s infamous “extraordinary rendition”1 program from 
proceeding against Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (“Jeppesen”). Jeppesen 
allegedly had been complicit with the federal government in the 
program by providing transportation and logistical support that 
allowed the plaintiffs to be moved clandestinely to foreign countries, 
where they were subjected to torture.2 
The state secrets doctrine is an evidentiary privilege that the 
federal government is permitted to invoke in the interest of national 
security where disclosure of sensitive information during the course 
of litigation “might compromise or embarrass our government in its 
public duties” or be detrimental to the public welfare.3 The Supreme 
Court has created two distinct iterations of the doctrine—the Totten 
bar and the Reynolds privilege.4 Where a court determines that the 
stronger iteration of the doctrine—the Totten bar—applies, the 
lawsuit at issue must categorically be dismissed.5 Where the weaker 
iteration of the doctrine—the Reynolds privilege—applies, the lawsuit 
 
 1. See Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets Privilege: Keeping 
Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 629, 629 n.1 (2007) (“The term 
‘extraordinary renditions’ refers to a program that began in the early 1990s and continues to 
this day, whereby the Central Intelligence Agency, together with other U.S. government 
agencies, transfer foreign nationals suspected of involvement in terrorism to detention and 
interrogation in countries where—in the U.S. government’s view—federal and international 
legal safeguards do not apply. Suspects are detained and interrogated either by U.S. personnel 
at U.S.-run detention facilities outside U.S. sovereign territory, or, alternatively, are handed 
over to the custody of foreign agents for interrogation.”). 
 2. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011). 
 3. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1875). 
 4. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 5. See infra Part III.A. 
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at issue might need to be dismissed in some circumstances, but in 
other circumstances the litigation may proceed forward, with the 
sensitive information simply being kept out of the record.6  
Although the doctrinal existence of the state secrets doctrine is 
obviously controversial given that it can prevent litigants from 
receiving judicial redress for wrongs perpetrated against them, this 
Note does not focus on the advisability of the doctrine, although 
plenty of prior scholarly commentary has criticized the doctrine and 
suggested the need for its reformation.7 This Note also does not 
focus on whether the Ninth Circuit was justified in applying the state 
secrets doctrine based on the facts at issue in Jeppesen. Such a critique 
would be very difficult. Because the choice about whether to apply 
the state secrets doctrine is generally premised on evidence that is 
never publicly disclosed,8 it is often nearly impossible for a third-
 
 6. See id.  
 7. See, e.g., Frank Askin, Secret Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 760, 763 (1991) (arguing that “[t]he current judicial tendency to give wide deference to 
government national security claims when they come into conflict with constitutional values is 
unjustified by the realities of governmental operations” and noting that “[t]he substantial 
record of abuse of the state secrets privilege by the federal government signals a need for 
rigorous testing of such claims in the courts” and suggesting that “unless the Reynolds doctrine 
is modified, constitutional rights will be unnecessarily sacrificed in the name of national 
security”); Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 
HARV. L. REV. 827, 936 (1957) (arguing that judges should be permitted to independently 
review the documents allegedly containing state secrets in camera to independently determine 
whether they should be able to be withheld); Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: 
Expanding Its Scope Through Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 100 (2007) 
(arguing that the state secrets doctrine is “being used as a tool to prevent cases that could 
otherwise be brought in court from receiving review in that forum. It is effectively denying 
litigants their day in court and interfering with public and private rights.”); Daniel C. Gardner, 
Comment, The Big Bad State Secrets Privilege: Why McDonnell Douglas’ Superior Knowledge 
Claim Was Doomed and How to Minimize the Effects of the Privilege Without Endangering 
National Security, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 549, 554, 579, 745 (2001) (referring to the state secrets 
doctrine as “invidious” and “drastic” and arguing that “[a]lthough the state secrets privilege is 
a proper exercise of the United States sovereign power, the effect of the privilege should be 
minimized as much as possible”). 
 8. For example, in Jeppesen the government filed a classified declaration that never 
became part of the record in support of its assertion that the state secrets doctrine applied. The 
court made its determination about the appropriate applicability of the doctrine based in large 
part upon this classified declaration. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 
1086 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (“We have thoroughly and 
critically reviewed the government’s public and classified declarations and are convinced that at 
least some of the matters it seeks to protect from disclosure in this litigation are valid state 
secrets . . . . The government’s classified disclosures to the court are persuasive that compelled 
or inadvertent disclosure of such information in the course of litigation would seriously harm 
legitimate national security interests.”).  
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party observer to assess whether a court properly dismissed a suit 
where the doctrine was invoked.  
Instead, this Note argues that the Jeppesen court, having chosen 
to apply the state secrets doctrine, applied it in a fashion that was 
clearly out of harmony with relevant Supreme Court state secrets 
doctrine precedent. This relevant precedent recognizes that there are 
two, distinct iterations of the state secrets doctrine: the more robust 
Totten bar and the weaker Reynolds privilege. Although the Ninth 
Circuit’s Jeppesen opinion, which applied the Reynolds privilege, 
stated that it recognized the independent viability of the Totten bar, 
Jeppesen functionally—although only implicitly—abolished that bar 
because the court’s justifications for using the Reynolds privilege 
instead of the Totten bar are likely to apply in nearly all cases that 
implicate the state secrets doctrine. Consequently, lower courts are 
likely to read Jeppesen as a mandate to always apply the Reynolds 
privilege, effectively abolishing the Totten bar.  
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The five plaintiffs in Jeppesen alleged that they were victims of the 
United States government’s “extraordinary rendition” program.9 
The plaintiffs claimed that the government had apprehended them 
because of their suspected terrorist activities and transferred them to 
foreign countries where they could be tortured and interrogated 
using methods prohibited in the United States.10 
The first of the plaintiffs, Ahmed Agiza (“Agiza”) was an 
Egyptian national. He claimed that he was apprehended while in 
Europe, given over to American authorities, and then flown to Egypt 
and placed into a “squalid, windowless, and frigid cell” where he 
endured tortures such as “severe[] and repeated[] beat[ings]” and 
“electric shock through electrodes attached to his ear lobes, nipples 
and genitals.”11 After being held for over two years, he received a 
fifteen-year sentence in an Egyptian prison.12 
Agiza’s experience was similar to the experiences of the other 
four plaintiffs. Each of the other plaintiffs, like Agiza, claimed to 
have suffered unspeakable tortures such as being “deprived of sleep 
 
 9. Id. at 1073–74. 
 10. See id. at 1073–75. 
 11.  Id. at 1074 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. Id. 
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and food and threatened with sexual torture, including sodomy with 
a bottle and castration,”13 “routine[] beating . . . and breaking [of] 
bones,” “cut[ting] with a scalpel all over [the] body including [the] 
penis” followed by “pour[ing] ‘hot stinging liquid’ into the open 
wounds,” and “being made to ‘listen to extremely loud music day 
and night’” and other loud noises, including “the recorded screams 
of women and children.”14 
The five plaintiffs brought suit against Jeppesen, a United States 
corporation that provides logistical transportation support services, 
including a full range of services catering to the military,15 for the 
company’s alleged involvement in transporting the plaintiffs to the 
sites where they were allegedly tortured.16 The plaintiffs claimed that 
Jeppesen had “provided flight planning and logistical support 
services to the aircraft and crew on all of the flights transporting each 
of the five plaintiffs among the various locations where they were 
detained and allegedly subjected to torture.”17 The plaintiffs also 
claimed that Jeppesen had “actual or constructive knowledge” that 
these planes were a part of the extraordinary rendition program.18  
The procedural history of Jeppesen is relatively complex. As soon 
as the plaintiffs filed their complaint, and before Jeppesen had even 
answered, the United States government moved to intervene in the 
suit and to have the complaint dismissed.19 The United States filed 
two declarations in support of its motion to dismiss; one of these 
documents was classified and the other was public.20 The public 
declaration explained that allowing for disclosure of the information 
claimed as privileged “could be expected to cause serious—and in 
some instances exceptionally grave—damage to the national security 
of the United States.”21 Consequently, the declaration stated that 
 
 13. Id. (describing the experience of “Plaintiff Abou Elkassim Britel, a 40-year-old 
Italian citizen of Moroccan origin”).  
 14. Id. (recounting the experience of “Plaintiff Binyam Mohamed, a 28-year-old 
Ethiopian citizen and legal resident of the United Kingdom”).  
 15. See JEPPESEN DATAPLAN, INC., http://www.jeppesen.com/industry-
solutions/aviation/military/jeppesen-military-products-and-services.jsp (last visited Oct. 15, 
2011) (containing a description of the military logistical services provided by Jeppesen 
Dataplan, Inc.).  
 16. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1075. 
 17. Id.   
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 1076.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
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“because highly classified information is central to the allegations 
and issues in this case,” the court should dismiss the case.22 
Alternatively, the United States government asserted that at the very 
least the “information should be excluded from any use in this 
case.”23  
The district court granted the government’s motion for 
dismissal, finding that this was clearly a matter that implicated the 
state secrets doctrine.24 The plaintiffs appealed, and a three-judge 
panel from the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that 
the government had not established the applicability of the state 
secrets doctrine, but allowing for the possibility that the doctrine 
might be used later in the litigation.25 Before the case had actually 
been remanded, the Ninth Circuit decided to reconsider the case “en 
banc to resolve questions of exceptional importance regarding the 
scope and application of the state secrets doctrine.”26 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
After very briefly introducing the state secrets doctrine, the 
remainder of this section explains the jurisprudential development of 
the two separate iterations of the doctrine: the Totten bar and the 
Reynolds privilege. 
A. State Secrets Doctrine 
The state secrets doctrine made its first appearance in American 
courts directly following the Civil War in the 1875 case of Totten v. 
United States.27 The state secrets doctrine is a privilege that may only 
 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 1076–77.  
 25. Id. at 1077. 
 26. Id. En banc hearings are generally reserved for these exceptional circumstances. Fed. 
R. App. P. 35(a)(2) (“A majority of the circuit judges . . . may order that an appeal or other 
proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc. An en banc hearing or 
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless . . . the proceeding involves a 
question of exceptional importance.”). 
 27. See Jason A. Crook, From the Civil War to the War on Terror: The Evolution and 
Application of the State Secrets Privilege, 72 ALB. L. REV. 57, 58 (2009) (“Although it would 
take some time for the state secrets privilege to develop its current scope and power, the case 
of Totten v. United States marks the first general instance of its use in American 
jurisprudence.”); c.f. Hansen, supra note 1, at 631 n.8 (suggesting that dicta in the 1803 
Supreme Court decision of Marbury v. Madison was an early application of the doctrine).  
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be asserted by the government, never by a private actor.28 The 
doctrine is premised on the idea that courts must act to “prevent 
disclosure of state secrets” in a narrow class of “exceptional 
circumstances” where such prevention of disclosure is “in the interest 
of the country’s national security.”29  
Because application of the state secrets doctrine may impair the 
rights of litigants, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the 
government should only be permitted to employ the state secrets 
doctrine in narrow circumstances.30 Nonetheless, where necessary in 
the interest of national security, application of the stronger iteration 
of the state secrets doctrine, the Totten bar, can result in the 
“dismissing [of] a case entirely.”31 In other cases, though, a weaker 
iteration of the doctrine, the Reynolds privilege, might merely act to 
require exclusion of certain evidence, but still allow a case to proceed 
forward.32  
B. The Totten Bar 
As mentioned in the foregoing section, the first application of 
the state secrets doctrine in the United States came in the post-Civil 
War case of Totten v. United States. Totten involved a breach of 
contract claim by the executor of the estate of a former Union spy 
against the federal government.33 The executor claimed that the 
deceased spy, William A. Lloyd, had entered into an espionage 
contract with President Lincoln in July 1861.34 The executor claimed 
that while Lloyd fulfilled his obligation by spying throughout the 
duration of the war, at the close of the war he had only been paid an 
amount sufficient to reimburse him for his expenses, not the 
promised consideration under his contract.35  
Without disputing the validity of the executor’s contractual 
claim, the Supreme Court determined that the claim could not 
 
 28. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). 
 29. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1077.  
 30. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.  
 31. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1077; see also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105–06 
(1875). 
 32. See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–9. 
 33. Totten, 92 U.S. at 105–06. 
 34. Id. at 106.  
 35. Id.  
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proceed.36 The Court noted that the employment of spies was secret 
and clandestine and that, in an action such as this one, allowing a 
suit to proceed might expose sensitive facts “to the serious detriment 
of the public” or “might compromise or embarrass our government 
in its public duties.”37 The Court noted that if this litigation were 
allowed to continue forward, thereby creating “liability to publicity,” 
the government’s ability to carry out the country’s “indispensable” 
program of “secret service” would be “impossible.”38 Consequently, 
the Supreme Court dismissed the entire lawsuit.39 Thus, although 
Totten did not fully define the contours of the Totten bar iteration of 
the state secrets doctrine, the case did establish that application of 
the Totten bar categorically requires case dismissal.  
While a number of later cases have utilized the Totten bar,40 
because of space constraints, the only other Totten bar case that will 
be addressed here is the Supreme Court’s most recent decision 
invoking the bar, the 2005 decision of Tenet v. Doe. Prior to Tenet, 
some commentators had suggested that the Totten bar had been 
completely eclipsed by the other iteration of the state secrets 
doctrine, the Reynolds privilege.41 However, the Supreme Court 
made clear, by reversing the Ninth Circuit in Tenet, that the Totten 
bar is alive and well.  
Tenet involved a claim by a former spy of the United States. This 
spy, who apparently had provided espionage services during the Cold 
War era, claimed that the government had promised to always 
provide him and his wife with financial assistance and security for life; 
he alleged that following the close of the Cold War, the government 
actually began providing the couple with monetary benefit payments. 
Later, the spy agreed to the cessation of such benefits because he 
found stable work.42 All was well until 1997, when the former spy 
was laid off from the employment he had found.43 When he could 
 
 36. Id. at 106–07. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39.  Id. at 107. 
 40. See Sean C. Flynn, The Totten Doctrine and Its Poisoned Progeny, 25 VT. L. REV. 
793, 793-94 (2000) (explaining that the Totten bar has been invoked over sixty-five times and 
providing citations to all of the cases that have invoked the bar).  
 41. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 1, at 633 (“The current incarnation of the state secrets 
privilege derives from the Cold War era case of United States v. Reynolds.”). 
 42. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 4 (2005). 
 43. Id. 
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not readily find other work, he asked the government to begin 
providing him with benefits once again, but the government 
refused.44 He brought suit.  
The Court held that his claim was prohibited from proceeding by 
the Totten bar, thereby reasserting the validity of this particular 
iteration of the state secrets doctrine.45 The Court reasoned that if 
the suit continued, there existed the “possibility that . . . an 
espionage relationship may be revealed [which might] well impair 
intelligence gathering . . . [or] reveal classified information that may 
undermine ongoing covert operations,” a possibility the Court 
deemed “unacceptable.”46 The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit 
was wrong to believe that Totten “had been recast simply as an early 
expression of the evidentiary ‘state secrets’ privilege, rather than a 
categorical bar to . . . claims.”47 The Court noted that it had 
continued to look to Totten in contemporary cases48 and that the 
Totten bar prong of the state secrets doctrine still had independent 
viability and vitality.49 The Court explained that Totten should apply 
as a categorical bar in all cases where “trial . . . would inevitably lead 
to disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as 
confidential,”50 such as when prevailing in a case would require 
showing “the existence of [a] secret espionage relationship with the 
Government.”51  
C. The Reynolds Privilege 
As previously noted, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the 
state secrets doctrine should not be lightly deployed by courts 
 
 44. Id. at 5. 
 45. Id. at 3. 
 46. Id. at 11 (citations omitted). 
 47. Id. at 8. 
 48. For example, the Court noted that it had relied on Totten in Weinberger v. Catholic 
Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146–47 (1981) and explained that 
Weinberger had “cite[d] Totten in holding that ‘whether or not the Navy has complied with [§ 
102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 . . . ‘to the fullest extent 
possible’ is beyond judicial scrutiny in this case,’ where ‘[d]ue to national security reasons,’ the 
Navy could ‘neither admit nor deny’ the fact that was central to the suit, i.e., ‘that it 
propose[d] to store nuclear weapons’ at a facility.” Id. at 9.  
 49. See id. at 8–9.  
 50. Id. at 8 (citation omitted). 
 51. Id.  
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because it can impair the rights of litigants.52 As the previous 
subsection established, there are certain state secrets cases where 
litigation simply cannot proceed; however, in other cases, a softer 
iteration of the state secrets doctrine is sufficient to protect the 
government’s interest in nondisclosure of sensitive information. The 
Court first recognized this softer iteration of the doctrine in the 
1953 case of United States v. Reynolds.53 
In Reynolds, the estates of several civilians brought suit against 
the government after the civilians were killed in a military aircraft 
accident.54 This aircraft had been testing top-secret electronic 
equipment.55 Pursuant to the litigation, the victims’ families sought 
discovery of the official accident investigation documents from the 
Air Force, and the government moved to quash this motion, citing 
the state secrets doctrine and explaining that the accident report 
contained secret information.56 The Court held that a gentler 
iteration of the state secrets doctrine, the Reynolds privilege, was 
applicable.57 The Court adopted a sort of “balancing test” approach 
for invocations of the Reynolds privilege58 and noted that the 
strength of the privilege varies in relation to the degree to which the 
plaintiffs in court need the evidence. The Court also explained, 
however, that even where there is a great need for such evidence, if 
state secrets are truly implicated, such evidence must nonetheless be 
excluded.59 
The Court clearly established that the Reynolds evidentiary 
privilege operated dissimilarly to the Totten bar. The Reynolds 
privilege operates as an evidentiary privilege during the course of 
litigation that allows certain suits to proceed, while the Totten bar 
 
 52. See Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through 
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 100 (2007) (arguing that the state secrets 
doctrine is “being used as a tool to prevent cases that could otherwise be brought in court 
from receiving review in that forum. It is effectively denying litigants their day in court and 
interfering with public and private rights.”).  
 53. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). But see Lyons, supra note 52, at 101 (noting that there was a 
“common-law privilege” that “had a life prior to Reynolds”).  
 54. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2–3.  
 55. Id. at 3.  
 56. Id. at 3–4.  
 57. Id. at 6–9.  
 58. Lyons, supra note 52, at 103 (“A critical aspect of the Reynolds holding is the 
Court’s formulation of a balancing test, which should be applied on a case-by-case basis when 
addressing the privilege.”). 
 59. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.  
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instead bars a suit at the pleading stage and categorically precludes 
further litigation.60  
While a number of later, lower-court decisions have utilized the 
Reynolds privilege, in the interest of space, these later, lower-court 
decisions are not considered in this Note.61 The Supreme Court has 
not provided further explication of the privilege, but it did reassert 
its viability in dicta in Tenet v. Doe.62 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S JEPPESEN DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit’s Jeppesen opinion began by noting that the 
decision was complex because it required the court to “address the 
difficult balance the state secrets doctrine strikes between 
fundamental principles of our liberty, including justice, transparency, 
accountability and national security.”63 The majority opinion further 
noted that “[a]lthough as judges we strive to honor all of these 
principles, there are times when exceptional circumstances create an 
irreconcilable conflict between them.”  The majority explained that 
Jeppesen was such a case.64  
After recounting the facts and procedural history of the case, the 
Ninth Circuit provided a brief explanation of the Totten bar and a 
very detailed explanation of the Reynolds privilege.65 The court noted 
that the Totten bar and Reynolds privilege are distinct iterations of 
the state secrets doctrine.66 It clarified that while the Totten bar has 
 
 60. See id. at 11 n.26 (explaining that in Totten “where the very subject matter of the 
action, a contract to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret,” then “[t]he action was 
dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence, since it was so 
obvious that the action should never prevail”).  
 61. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302–03 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that “Reynolds, the Supreme Court’s leading decision on the state secrets privilege, 
established the doctrine in its modern form,” before applying the doctrine); Black v. United 
States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the “state secrets privilege is 
defined in [Reynolds]”); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 62. 544 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2005); see also Lyons, supra note 52 at 105 (noting that the 
Supreme “Court recently reaffirmed the Reynolds standards in dicta in Tenet v. Doe”).  
 63. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 64. Id.  
 65. The court’s explanation of the Totten bar that spanned less than two pages, id. at 
1077–79, was far less detailed than its explanation of the Reynolds privilege, which spanned 
over five pages, id. at 1079–1083. 
 66. Id. at 1077 (“The contemporary state secrets doctrine encompasses two applications 
of this principle. One completely bars adjudication of claims premised on state secrets (the 
‘Totten bar’); the other is an evidentiary privilege (‘the Reynolds privilege’). . . .”).  
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been commonly interpreted to apply to espionage cases, it is not 
limited only to cases involving espionage relationships with the 
government because it “rests on a general principle that extends 
beyond that specific context.”67 Furthermore, the bar “has evolved 
into the principle that where the very subject matter of a lawsuit is a 
matter of state secret, the action must be dismissed without reaching 
the question of evidence.”68 The majority opinion also explained that 
“[t]he purpose of the bar . . . is to prevent the revelation of state 
secrets harmful to national security”69 and “[i]n addition to the 
Totten bar,” there is another iteration of the state secrets doctrine.70 
Instead of acting as a categorical bar, this additional iteration works 
as an evidentiary privilege that, “[u]nlike the Totten bar . . . does not 
automatically require dismissal of [a] case.”71 The court explained 
that application of the Reynolds privilege involves a three-step process 
that (1) requires certain procedural requirements be met, (2) 
requires the court to make an independent investigation about 
whether the information is privileged, and (3) requires the court to 
determine how to proceed if the information is deemed privileged.72 
After explaining the differences between the Totten bar and the 
Reynolds privilege, the majority opinion applied both to the plaintiffs 
in Jeppesen.73 In applying the Totten bar, the Ninth Circuit explained 
that “some of plaintiffs’ claims might well fall within the Totten bar,” 
but it further noted that the Supreme Court had not “offered much 
guidance on when the Totten bar” applied outside of cases “premised 
on secret espionage agreements or the location of nuclear 
weapons.”74 It added that because the Totten bar was infrequently 
invoked and because “conducting a more detailed analysis [would] 
tend to improve the accuracy, transparency and legitimacy of 
proceedings,” district courts should “ordinarily undertake a detailed 
Reynolds analysis before deciding whether dismissal on the pleadings 
is justified.”75 The court stated it would not “resolve the difficult 
 
 67. Id. at 1078–79. 
 68. Id. at 1079 (quoting Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 
1197 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 1080.  
 73. Id. at 1083. 
 74. Id. at 1084. 
 75. Id.  
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question of precisely which claims may be barred under Totten 
because application of the Reynolds privilege leads us to conclude 
that this litigation cannot proceed further.”76  
The Ninth Circuit stated that it chose to rely on the Reynolds 
privilege instead of the Totten bar for three reasons: (1) the 
government had raised both a Reynolds privilege claim and a Totten 
bar claim so the court was at liberty to address both claims, (2) the 
court was at liberty to affirm on any basis supported by the record, 
and (3) resolving the case under Reynolds “avoid[ed] difficult 
questions about the precise scope of the Totten bar and permits us to 
conduct a searching judicial review . . . .”77 The court then applied 
the Reynolds privilege, ultimately concluding, after “thoroughly and 
critically” reviewing the government’s declarations, that some of the 
evidence was privileged and that dismissal of the case on the basis of 
the Reynolds privilege was the proper course of action because there 
was “no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen’s alleged liability without 
creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets.”78 The 
majority opinion concluded by noting that its decision would 
provide guidance for lower courts who would now know that 
“Totten has its limits” and that “every effort should be made to parse 
claims to salvage a case like this using the Reynolds approach,” 
because “the standards for peremptory dismissal are very high and it 
is the district court’s role to use its fact-finding and other tools to 
full advantage before it concludes that the rare step of dismissal is 
justified.”79  
An extremely short, two-paragraph concurring judgment 
followed, with a single concurring judge suggesting that the case 
should have properly been decided under the Totten bar.80 Five 
judges dissented.81 A detailed discussion of the dissent is omitted 
because it is not relevant to this Note, but the dissent’s main 
contention was that only the Totten bar, and never the Reynolds 
privilege, could be permissibly applied to dismiss a case at the 
pleadings stage.82  
 
 76. Id. at 1085.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 1086–87.  
 79. Id. at 1092–93.  
 80. See id. at 1093.  
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 1093–101. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
The Jeppesen decision is out of sync with relevant, recent 
Supreme Court precedent. Although this precedent suggests that the 
Totten bar is an independently viable iteration of the state secrets 
doctrine, the Jeppesen decision nonetheless subtly and implicitly 
discards the Totten bar because the decision’s justifications for 
resolving the case using the Reynolds privilege instead of the Totten 
bar are likely to apply in nearly all future cases where the state secrets 
doctrine is implicated. This section begins by explaining why clear 
and transparent legal standards are of particularly great importance in 
the area of state secrets doctrine jurisprudence. Then, this section 
explains why the Ninth Circuit’s Jeppesen decision lacked clarity by 
exploring the Jeppesen court’s justifications for resolving the case 
using the Reynolds privilege instead of the Totten bar. Finally, this 
section concludes by discussing how the application of these 
justifications in future cases will create a fundamental and 
impermissible reworking of state secrets jurisprudence that is out of 
sync with relevant Supreme Court precedent.  
A. State Secrets Doctrine—Balance of Competing Interests 
The Ninth Circuit’s failure to articulate clear legal standards to 
guide the proper application of the state secrets doctrine is 
particularly troubling given the manner in which the state secrets 
doctrine is applied and the important interests at stake.83 The nature 
of the state secrets doctrine makes it largely impossible for third-
party observers to assess whether courts have properly applied the 
doctrine because where the Totten bar iteration of the doctrine 
applies, it completely precludes litigation from proceeding, and 
where the Reynolds privilege iteration applies, it prevents certain 
evidence from ever being entered into the record.84  
In cases where a court must decide whether to apply an iteration 
of the state secrets doctrine, the court is essentially asked to weigh 
transparency, justice, and disclosure against the executive’s assertion 
of a need to protect national security. After engaging in this 
balancing inquiry, the court must then decide which of these 
interests is paramount. Given the important interests at stake in this 
 
 83. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.  
 84. See supra note 8. 
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balancing inquiry and the difficulty of critically assessing a court’s 
decision about whether to apply the state secrets doctrine, there are 
few areas of the law where clear legal standards are of greater 
importance. 
B. Totten Bar Versus Reynolds Privilege 
Although the Jeppesen court understood that it was being asked 
to weigh competing interests,85 an inquiry that should have signaled 
the necessity of transparent legal reasoning, the court’s legal 
reasoning nonetheless proceeded in an opaque fashion. While the 
court correctly recognized that the state secrets doctrines has two 
distinct iterations,86 the court decided the case under the Reynolds 
privilege without providing adequate explanation as to why the more 
restrictive Totten bar should not apply.87  
Initially, the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Reynolds privilege 
instead of the Totten bar appears functionally unproblematic because 
it produced the same ultimate result as an application of the Totten 
bar would have produced. However, such an analysis ignores the ex 
ante effects of the decision upon future cases where the state secrets 
doctrine will be implicated. 
Supreme Court precedent has clearly established that the Totten 
bar and the Reynolds privilege are distinct iterations of the state 
secrets doctrine even if the application of the Reynolds privilege 
ultimately produced the same level of protection as the Totten bar in 
the specific Jeppesen case.88 The Totten bar provides greater 
protection against disclosure of state secrets since it categorically 
requires dismissal of suits, whereas the Reynolds privilege is a mere 
evidentiary privilege that may or may not require dismissal. 
Therefore, from a macro viewpoint the Totten bar provides greater 
protection against disclosure of state secrets than the Reynolds 
privilege.  
Given that the Ninth Circuit understood that the Totten bar was 
a more restrictive standard, why then did it still decide Jeppesen by 
using the Reynolds privilege? Firstly, the court reasoned that the legal 
 
 85. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1093 (“We also acknowledge that this case presents a 
painful conflict between human rights and national security.”).   
 86. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.  
 87. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.  
 88. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8 (2005). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/20/2012 11:29 AM 
407 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 
 421 
standards governing the applicability of the Totten bar were unclear, 
and secondly, because the case involved a difficult decision that 
required the court to weigh various “competing values” that 
warranted a more searching inquiry.89 Therefore, it appears that the 
court used the Reynolds privilege because the case was a hard one, 
and the court was uncertain whether the Totten bar applied. These 
justifications seem reasonable, but considering the likely effects of 
applying them in future state secrets doctrine cases illustrates why 
these justifications are problematic.  
While the Ninth Circuit may be correct in asserting that the legal 
standards governing the applicability of the Totten bar are not as 
clear as they might be,90 the court ignores the fact that the Supreme 
Court applied the standard as recently as 2005, suggesting that the 
standards are not so esoteric that they lack any meaning. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, the Ninth Circuit seemingly 
fails to recognize that nearly all cases involving potential application 
of the state secrets doctrine will involve “competing values”91 similar 
to those implicated in Jeppesen. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s 
justifications for not using the Totten bar will be applicable in nearly 
all state secrets doctrine cases. Because this is true, although the 
Ninth Circuit made a paean to the Totten bar’s continuing viability, 
the court simultaneously signaled its untimely death by failing to 
articulate legal standards that would guide lower courts in their 
future attempts to apply the bar in future cases and by suggesting 
that the bar is inapplicable in cases, like Jeppesen, that involve 
“competing values.” The court’s reasoning thus weakens the state 
secrets doctrine by functionally placing a jurisprudential thumb on 
the side of the balancing scale where the values of transparency, 
justice, and full disclosure lie. Under the new, Ninth Circuit state-
secrets jurisprudential model, these values occupy a position of 
relative favor as compared to national security interests because the 
values of justice, transparency and full disclosure are omnipresent 
“competing values,” and it will nearly always be uncertain whether 
the Totten bar should apply. Therefore, lower courts, unsure of when 
the Totten bar should apply, and weighing the many “competing 
values” inherent in cases involving application of the state secrets 
 
 89. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1084. 
 90. See id. 
 91.  “[T]he state secrets doctrine . . . [must balance] fundamental principles of our 
liberty, including justice, transparency, accountability and national security.” Id. at 1073.  
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doctrine, will likely always use—out of an abundance of caution—the 
less restrictive Reynolds privilege.92 
While many commentators might see such a weakening of the 
state secrets doctrine as a positive legal development,93 this Note is 
not focused on the advisability of the state secrets doctrine. If the 
Totten bar is going to be discarded, it should be discarded clearly, 
openly, and based on its merits, instead of implicitly through sleight 
of hand and a categorical shift. In addition, because the Supreme 
Court has asserted the viability of the Totten bar as recently as 2005, 
the Supreme Court is the only actor empowered to abandon the bar. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the Ninth Circuit stated that the Totten bar is an 
independent iteration of the state secrets doctrine, because the 
court’s justifications for resolving Jeppesen using the Reynolds 
privilege instead of the Totten bar are likely to apply in nearly all state 
secrets cases, the court’s opinion effectively discarded the Totten bar, 
which provides greater protection for state secrets. Consequently, 
Jeppesen is out of sync with relevant Supreme Court precedent 
explaining that the Totten bar is still a viable, independent iteration 
of the state secrets doctrine. 




 92. See id. at 1084–85 (explaining that a lack of clarity and certainty meant that courts 
should “ordinarily undertake a detailed Reynolds analysis before deciding whether dismissal on 
the pleadings is justified”). 
 93. See generally, e.g., Christopher D. Yamaoka, The State Secrets Privilege: What’s Wrong 
With It, How It Got That Way, and How the Courts Can Fix It, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
139 (2007–08).  
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